How Belarus’s KGB Contacts Activists Abroad Through Telegram and Social Media

"I'm writing to you from Minsk." "Do you know where this message is coming from?" These are the kinds of messages Belarusian activists living abroad have been receiving on Telegram, Facebook, and Viber over the past several years.

When activists were still in Belarus, they could be summoned for questioning through detention or official subpoenas issued as part of criminal investigations. Once they leave the country, however, the authorities have only one practical way to reach them: by trying to start a conversation online.

They usually begin politely, addressing people by name and creating the impression of an ordinary conversation. What happens next depends. The best strategy is usually to ignore the messages—but in response, the unknown senders may resort to psychological pressure and manipulation in an attempt to force contact.

In this article, Euroradio examines two cases involving political activists: one in which ignoring the messages worked, and another in which the security services used the activists' parents to apply pressure.

They reached her through her parents

Belarusian security services first began contacting political activist Nasta (name changed. — Euroradio), who lives abroad, through various social media platforms in 2023. The messages were usually along the lines of: "Hello, I represent the Republic of Belarus. We would like you to return to the country." Then, in early September 2025, a Facebook account registered in the Czech Republic, which had been sending friend requests to many Belarusians, sent her a personalized message with a joking tone.

Nasta ignored it. But at the end of October, security officers showed up at her parents' workplace in Belarus.

— I got a Telegram message from my mother saying: "Dear daughter, could you please call me on this date at this time so we can discuss some family matters?" I immediately thought that either something terrible had happened or the KGB had shown up and wanted to talk to me. Of course, I agreed.

Перапіска з КДБ. Як спецслужбы выклікаюць на размову беларусаў у эміграцыі

When the agreed time came, they called each other. At first, the conversation was about ordinary family matters.

— Then my mother said she was with some people who really wanted to speak to me. My first question was whether they were threatening her. She said they were sitting right there with her. In that situation, refusing wasn't really an option. So I agreed.

He introduced himself and gave me his name—though I had no way of verifying who he actually was. He said that certain changes were taking place in Belarus's political life and that they would very much like young people to return home. He told me they believed I genuinely wanted what was best for Belarus, unlike others who, according to him, were doing it for money. I replied that he was doing it for money too, whereas I was talking to him for free. He kept repeating his points and asked whether anyone else I knew might be willing to speak with them. I said I had a few questions of my own. That was basically the conversation. And he still messages me from time to time.

There is no obvious pattern to the messages. The activist noticed that he contacted her when she was traveling abroad or when political prisoners were released. Attempts to steer the conversation toward other topics never worked—the man always returned to the same script.

— They want to talk to me—fine, I'll give them that opportunity. But I reserve the right to decide whether I answer or not. So far, that's exactly what I've been doing.

— I don't think I'm giving away anything of value. On the other hand, he's leaked things to me twice. For example, the last time political prisoners were released [March 19 — Euroradio], he decided to tell me about it in advance, basically saying, "Just wait."

Nasta says the security officer also visits her mother at work about once a month and asks how her daughter is doing. The two women have their own "security protocol" and a set of signals that would let them know if something had gone wrong.

For now, Nasta has no idea how this line of communication will end, though she acknowledges that it could ultimately be used against her.

— As soon as this started, I immediately warned my friend and colleague that I was in contact with them [the Belarusian security services. — Euroradio]. I told them I didn't know where this communication might lead, but I wanted them to know about it from the very beginning.

They threatened a smear campaign

Valer Matskevich has extensive experience dealing with the Belarusian security services dating back to his time as a Malady Front activist in Babruisk. Today, however, their interest in him stems from his work in exile. Matskevich is a member of the Coordination Council and chief of staff of the United Transitional Cabinet.

Matskevich says there have been several waves of messages from strangers offering "cooperation" since he left Belarus. The first came during the campaign for the previous Coordination Council elections in 2024. At the same time, criminal cases were opened against all candidates still in Belarus, and security forces searched their registered addresses. Another wave of messages followed after the United Transitional Cabinet was designated a "terrorist organization" by the Belarusian authorities.

The politician adopted a simple rule: never respond to strangers.

— At first, I just took screenshots of these messages "for the record," so to speak. Sometimes, after I blocked and deleted the accounts, I'd wake up the next day to dozens of missed Telegram calls from users with very strange usernames—just two letters or random symbols. It was obvious these weren't work-related contacts or anyone from our circle.

Sometimes they also suggest speaking by phone. To "prove" who they are, they may offer to call from the activist's parents' landline—a tactic that puts additional psychological pressure on the person abroad. Valer Matskevich's family has experienced this firsthand because of his long-standing political activism.

— Not long ago, criminal investigators came to my parents' home yet again, supposedly looking for me. There were searches and repeated attempts to pressure them psychologically. But we're all adults. My parents have every right not to know where I am or what I'm doing.

After months of ignoring the messages, the politician began receiving threats that a smear campaign would be launched against him. The senders promised to destroy his reputation without explaining what accusations they intended to use. Around the same time, the Coordination Council was holding a session that was streamed live on YouTube. During the broadcast, Matskevich publicly mentioned the threats. The response came almost immediately: "We gave you a chance. Now you'll have to live with the consequences."

After that, Matskevich wrote a public Facebook post about the messages. According to him, the tone of the messages changed almost immediately—they became noticeably more uncertain.

— They started sending philosophical messages like, "Come on, you know how things really are." It was obvious they'd gone off script. That's the important thing—you have to break their script. When they realize their methods aren't working, they seem to lose their footing and don't know what to do next. After my post, I started receiving indignant messages written almost like a bunch of guys picking a fight. There was even some swearing. I only glanced at them through the message previews without opening them. That was enough to see that my approach had worked. They'd essentially fallen apart, switched to open aggression, and exhausted their script. I blocked them, and that was the end of it.

Based on the volume and coordination of the messages, Matskevich believes they were unlikely to have come from a single individual. Instead, he suspects they were sent by a unit responsible for monitoring members of the Coordination Council.

During our conversation, the politician repeatedly stressed that if you receive messages like these from strangers, the best response is not to engage—and, if possible, to make the attempts public.

— That strips them of their power. Their entire strategy depends on treating these contacts as something secret. They assume that if people don't talk about them publicly, it's because they have something to hide or are afraid of becoming involved in a scandal. That's exactly what the security services exploit to pressure people into communicating with them.

Matskevich believes there are many cases like his. But because these messages usually come from anonymous accounts or hidden phone numbers, they are difficult to trace. In his view, such incidents should be systematically documented and reported to the security services of the country where the recipient lives, as evidence that the Belarusian authorities continue to carry out repressive practices even against Belarusians who have fled abroad.

Euroradio is aware of similar recruitment attempts targeting not only political activists but also journalists and their relatives. For now, the most effective response remains the simplest one: no response at all.